

# Cheshire Resilience Forum

# Multi – Agency Emergency Response Manual

<b>Prepared by:</b>	Cheshire Local Resilience Forum
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## **FOREWORD**

The Cheshire Local Resilience Forum (CLRF) was formed following the publication of The Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It replaced the Strategic Emergency Liaison Committee, which had been providing Emergency Planning Direction and co-ordination of Emergency Response in Cheshire, Halton and Warrington for many years.

The Local Resilience Forum includes representatives from the following organisations:

- Cheshire Constabulary
- Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service
- North West Ambulance Service
- Cheshire West and Chester Council
- Cheshire East Council
- Halton Borough Council
- Warrington Borough Council
- Environment Agency
- Western Cheshire PCT (lead PCT for Emergency Preparedness) which represents all NHS organisations within Cheshire
- Health Protection Agency
- Maritime & Coastguard Agency
- Port Health Authority
- British Transport Police
- Health & Safety Executive
- Military
- Government Office North West
- Representatives of Category 2 Organisations (who have the right to attend if they wish or if specifically invited on a specific issue)
- Voluntary Agencies

Following a review of the existing structures for the emergency response it was felt that the LRF required a single document drawing together the separate plans developed by CLRF agencies. This plan is the result of that work and will help us to provide a unified response if there is an emergency. It will also help us set out clear management structures during any emergency.

This document has been prepared having regard to the latest agreed procedures circulated by the following organisations:

- Civil Contingencies Secretariat
- Cabinet Office
- The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
- The Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA)
- Ambulance Services Network
- Government Office for the North West
- Local (government) Authorities
- Department of Health

See Appendix A for a full list of responding agencies within CLRF

## SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Aim of the Document

- The aim of this document is to set out the response to an emergency requiring multi agency co-ordination.
- Describe the agreed procedures and arrangements for effective co-ordination thereby enhancing the collective response.
- The procedures adopted by each of the responding agencies to an emergency are understandably specific to the role of the agency concerned. This document also describes the agreed procedures and arrangements for effective co-ordination. In this way the collective response will be enhanced

### 1.2 Objectives

- To provide an overview of the response to Major Emergencies within the Cheshire LRF (CLRF) area.
- To promote and enhance existing integrated emergency management arrangements
- To describe the agreed procedures and arrangements for co-ordinating the response effectively
- To provide a briefing and training aid
- To signpost the key plans and procedures produced through the work of the CLRF that may be activated in the event of a Major Emergency
- To provide summaries of the roles and responsibilities of each of the responding agencies to a Major Emergency

### 1.3 Scope

This manual provides a multi agency generic overview to emergencies and should be treated as a guide. It offers a framework to allow those involved in responding to an emergency to work together as efficiently and effectively as possible. This manual is not intended to provide detail on topic specific or agency specific plans. Appendix B provides a list of additional plans available.

### 1.4 Territorial Extent

This plan relates to the area covered by The Cheshire Police Force

### 1.5 Audience

This document has been prepared primarily for the information and guidance of the responding agencies, but will provide guidance for any other stakeholders who may have a role in the response to an emergency.

### 1.6 Ownership and Authorisation

This manual has been co-ordinated and prepared by the CLRF General Working Group. Ownership of the manual rests with the CLRF. All agencies were consulted on content. Reviews and changes to the manual will be undertaken by the CLRF General Working Group annually.

## **1.7 Testing and Validation**

The manual will be tested and validated by reference in local exercises and via incidents.

## **1.8 Exercises**

CLRF Exercises will include those prioritised within the Risk register.

The main objectives of these exercises will be to:

- Train personnel likely to be involved in that type of incident.
- Provide validation of any specific plans and links to the generic response manual.
- Test procedures and systems.
- Provide an opportunity for agency representatives to practice roles.
- Develop competencies and identify training needs.

Each agency has a responsibility to ensure that appropriate numbers of staff are trained to fulfill their roles and responsibilities.

## **1.9 Audit and Amendments**

The manual will be subject to ongoing review and revision as new guidance becomes available or where lessons are learned through incidents. This is in addition to the formal annual review of the plan. All amendments to the manual will be communicated to partner agencies.

## **1.10 Publication and Distribution**

The full manual will be made available in electronic copy only to organisations listed in Appendix A. A version with protected content removed will be available on the Cheshire LRF Website

## **1.11 Freedom of Information and Data Protection**

Release of information contained in this document should be considered with regard to Freedom of Information and Data Protection legislation. Classification of the manual will be reviewed on an ongoing basis. A data sharing agreement is in place within CLRF

## **1.12 Key Principles for data protection guidance for Emergency Planning**

Data protection legislation does not prohibit the collection and sharing of personal data – it provides a framework where personal data can be used with confidence that individuals' privacy rights are respected.

Emergency responders' starting point should be to consider the risks and the potential harm that may arise if they do not share information.

Emergency responders should balance the potential damage to the individual (and where appropriate the public interest of keeping the information confidential) against the public interest in sharing the information.

In emergencies, the public interest consideration will generally be more significant than during day-to-day business.

Always check whether the objective can still be achieved by passing less personal data.

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Category 1 and 2 responders should be robust in asserting their power to share personal data lawfully in emergency planning, response and recovery situations. The consent of the data subject is not always a necessary pre-condition to lawful data sharing.

You should seek advice where you are in doubt – though prepare on the basis that you will need to make a decision without formal advice during an emergency

## SECTION 2 – DEFINITIONS

### Civil Contingencies Act – Definition of an Emergency

“An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom, the environment of a place in the United Kingdom or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom”.

A Category 1 Responder must perform its duties under the Act only in relation to two situations, either of which poses a considerable test for that organisation’s ability to perform its functions.

The two tests are:

- (a) where the emergency would be likely to seriously obstruct its ability to perform its functions;
- (b) where the Category 1 Responder:
  - (i) would consider it necessary or desirable to act to prevent, reduce, control, or mitigate the emergency’s effects, or otherwise take action; and
  - (ii) would be unable to act without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional resources.

*(Civil Contingencies Act 2004)*

### Type and Scale of “Emergency” within Cheshire, Halton and Warrington

#### Major Incident

2.1. A Major Incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority for:

- The rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties
- The involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people
- The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media usually to the police
- Any incident that requires the large scale combined resources of the emergency services
- The mobilisation and organization of the emergency services and supporting organisations

Note: This can also include a cloudburst incident which is a specific procedure in Cheshire for dealing with a flammable and / or a toxic release. See appendix C for details of cloudburst definitions.

#### Serious Incident

2.2 Within Cheshire, Halton and Warrington the definition of a ‘serious incident’ is as follows: any incident that is NOT a Major Incident, but:

- Has the potential to develop into a Major Incident, or
- Involves contamination of the environment, water courses or air pollution, or
- Involves evacuation or the potential for evacuation of any members of the public, or
- Involves major road closures, or
- Involves the distribution of specific health advice to any members of the public.

#### Other Incidents

2.3 Rising Tide Incident: These develop from a ‘steady state’ or ‘Business as usual’ to become an Emergency or major incident over a period of time, which may range from hours to days or weeks. Examples of this type of incident include Severe Weather events or disease epidemics

## Emergencies requiring regional engagement

2.4 There are four broad types of emergency each of which will require a degree of regional engagement. These definitions are currently used by the Regional Resilience Team and may in the future be adopted by the Cheshire, Halton and Warrington LRF. Further details can be found in Section 4 and in appendix D.

## Declaration

2.5 A major or serious incident may be declared by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority who considers that any of the criteria outlined above has been satisfied. An agency should not be criticised for declaring a major incident in the first instance, even if events later prove it not to be.

2.6 A major or serious incident to one of the responding agencies may not be so to another, however each of the other agencies will respond appropriately. This is so even if they are to be involved in a stand-by capacity and not directly involved in the incident.

## Stages

2.7 Most major incidents can be considered to have the following stages:


Timeline ↓	PROCESS	PHASE
	Response	Reaction
		Rescue
		Retrieval ( & Investigation)
	Recovery	Relief
		Remediation
		Regeneration

## SECTION 3 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

### Notification

- 3.1 Early notification to category one responders is essential and information needs to be updated constantly as the Incident progresses allowing a measured and appropriate response. The Command and Control flowchart on page 17 shows how communication continues following initial notifications.

**NOTIFICATION DIAGRAM FOR EMERGENCIES**



## **Levels of Command and Control**

- 3.2** The initial response to any incident is likely to be from day to day operational resources. Further tiers of incident command and control may be required to provide effective co-ordination of the emergency response. The most likely scenario is that the command structure builds from the bottom upwards.
- 3.3** It is important to distinguish between the respective functions of single and multiagency groups. Single agency groups have the authority to exercise a command function over their own personnel and assets. Multi-agency groups are convened to co-ordinate the involved agencies' activities and, where appropriate, define strategy and objectives for the multi-agency response as a whole. No single responding agency has command authority over any other agencies' personnel or assets. Where multi-agency co-ordinating groups are established to define strategy and objectives, it is expected that all involved responder agencies will work in a directed and co-ordinated fashion in pursuit of those objectives.
- 3.4** Although a multi-agency Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may colloquially be known by some responder bodies as a 'Gold Group', it is ambiguous to refer to the SCG simply as 'Gold.' Similarly, it is ambiguous to refer to a multi-agency Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) simply as 'Silver';
- 3.5** Gold and Silver describe single-agency levels of command, and they should be clearly distinguished from the multi-agency co-ordinating groups that exist at the corresponding level. Further, it is misleading to refer to the SCG Chair as 'Gold Commander'; it might be that the Police Gold Commander is also the SCG Chair, but in the role of SCG Chair s/he is exercising a co-ordination function, not a command function.

## **Joint Agency Command Co-ordination**

- 3.6** Cheshire Police has a responsibility to co-ordinate the combined response to an Emergency.

## **Operational (Bronze)**

- 3.7** Operational is the level at which the management of immediate "hands-on" work is undertaken at the site(s) of the emergency or other affected areas. Individual responder agencies may refer to the Operational level as Bronze.
- 3.8** Personnel first on the scene will take immediate steps to assess the nature and extent of the problem. Operational commanders will concentrate their effort and resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility – for example, the police will concentrate on establishing cordons, maintaining security and managing traffic. Agencies personnel will act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisation until higher levels of management are established.
- 3.9** Individual agencies retain command authority over their own resources and personnel deployed at the scene, but each agency must liaise and co-ordinate with all other agencies involved, ensuring a coherent and integrated effort. Under some circumstances this may require the temporary transfer of one organisation's

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personnel or assets under the control of another organisation. In most, but not all, instances, the police will co-ordinate the operational response at an identifiable scene.

- 3.10** It should be understood that the titles do not convey seniority, but depict the function carried out by that particular person. From the outset it is important that the senior officers of each agency at the scene liaise with each other. This will be the foundation upon which all later co-ordination will be based.
- 3.11** Senior officers arriving at their respective command/control vehicles are to establish contact with their incident commanders and should also make contact with the Tactical Co-ordinating Group in order to notify any transfer of command.
- 3.12** It is important that the titleholder wears a uniquely identifiable tabard and passes it on to their successor.

**Tactical (Silver)**

- 3.13** The purpose of the tactical level is to ensure that the actions taken by the operational level are co-ordinated, coherent and integrated in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency
- 3.14** Where formal co-ordination is required at the Tactical level then a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) may be convened. This will usually comprise the most senior officers of each agency committed within the area of operations, and will undertake tactical co-ordination of the response to the event or situation. Working in co-ordination, the responder agencies tactical commanders will:
- determine priorities for allocating available resources;
  - plan and co-ordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken;
  - obtain additional resources if required;
  - assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of operational commanders; and
  - ensure the health and safety of the public and personnel.
- 3.15** Due to the significant number of chemical sites and associated risks to emergency responders, procedures have been developed in CLRF to minimise the potential exposure to risks and to put into place effective co-ordination arrangements.. Current arrangements are to locate the TCG within one of the identified local Police stations. This approach is intended to ensure that information is available, shared and used in determining appropriate actions to mitigate the effects of the emergency.
- 3.16** Although each of the senior officers at the tactical level will have specific service or agency responsibilities, together they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and co-ordination required to deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, tactical commanders should not become directly involved in the detailed operational tasks being discharged by the operational level.
- 3.17** Recent experience at several emergencies in CLRF has shown that in many circumstances these have been effectively managed at this level of command and without the need to establish a strategic command.

- 3.18** Although each of the senior officers at the tactical level will have specific service or agency responsibilities, together they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and co-ordination required to deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, tactical commanders should not become directly involved in the detailed operational tasks being discharged by the operational level.
- 3.19** In those cases where it becomes clear that resources, expertise or co-ordination are required beyond the capacity of the tactical level (e.g. where there is more than one scene or incident), it may be necessary to invoke the strategic level of management to take overall command and set the strategic direction. Once this occurs, tactical commanders will continue to effect multi-agency co-ordination within their area of responsibility, while simultaneously directing tactical operations within the strategic direction and parameters set by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and promulgated through their respective agencies strategic commanders'.

### **Strategic (Gold)**

- 3.20** In a minority of emergencies where the scale, impact or nature of the emergency requires, a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) will be formed. The purpose of the Strategic level is to consider the emergency in its wider context; determine longer-term and wider impacts and risks with strategic implications; define and communicate the overarching strategy and objectives for the emergency response; establish the framework, policy and parameters for lower level tiers; and monitor the context, risks, impacts and progress towards defined objectives.
- 3.21** The SCG will:
- determine and promulgate a clear strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly;
  - establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation;
  - prioritise the requirements of the tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources accordingly;
  - formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans, potentially delegating this to one responding agency; and
  - direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.
- 3.22** At the outset a Senior Police Officer will act as Chair of the SCG and has the responsibility for the strategic direction of the incident and ensuring that the strategic decision making process is documented. However, the Chair may be handed over to a more appropriate person depending on the nature of the emergency.
- 3.23** The SCG Will meet at premises to be determined by the Strategic Commander, this will normally be Cheshire Police HQ

### **Representation**

- 3.24** The core responding agencies at both TCG and SCG should ensure a minimum of 2 persons per agency attend, who are appropriately trained. See Page 17 for details of

representatives at each Group.

- 3.25** Strategic level representatives nominated to attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) must be empowered to take corporate decisions on behalf of their parent organisation in support of the overall Strategic Coordination Group strategy. It is therefore essential that Strategic representatives are invested with the authority necessary to undertake the role and provided with the necessary back up and support to ensure any undertaking given by them to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group is actionable.

### Science & Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

#### 3.26 Purpose

The purpose of the STAC is to bring together technical experts from those agencies involved in the response and who will provide scientific or technical advice to the overall Police Incident Commander and responding agencies. This will enable all SCG Members to receive the best possible advice based on the Information available.

The requirement for STAC will be determined by the Senior Multi Agency Co-ordination Group

**For further information see Appendix Q.**

### Meetings of the Co-ordinating Groups

- 3.27** The decision as to how the meetings will be conducted rests with the chair of the group and will be guided by the nature of the incident and its longevity. Options available to the chair are for face to face meetings, Telephone Conference calls and Video Conference calls.

### Suggested Agenda for The Strategic Co-ordinating Group

- |  |   |                 |
|--|---|-----------------|
| 1.   | Introduction of attendees                                     | Chair           |
| 2.   | Declaration of items for urgent attention                     | Chair           |
| 2a.  | Decisions on items for urgent attention                       | Chair           |
| <b>Break out time to action urgent decisions</b> |   |                 |
| 3.   | Review and agree minutes of previous meetings                 | Chair           |
| 4.   | Update on Strategic Situation                                 | Staff Officer   |
| 5.   | Review and agree Strategic Aim and Objectives                 | Chair           |
| 6.   | Review outstanding Actions                                    | Chair           |
| 7.   | Update from Working Groups/cells/Attendees<br>( By exception) | Chair of groups |
| 8.   | i. Discuss and agree on Strategic decisions                   | All             |
|  | ii. Confirmation and allocation of actions required Members   |                 |
| 9.   | Date and Time of next meeting                                 | Chair           |
|  | Closure of meeting  |                 |

## SECTION 4

### Regional Civil Contingencies Committee

- 4.1** A Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) is a multi-agency group including representatives from across the region drawn from the emergency services, local authorities, Government Office for the North West, and others as appropriate. The location of the RCCC will be determined by Government Office North West in line with the requirements of the Regional Response Plan.
- 4.2** Initially, the Government Office Regional Resilience Team will identify members depending on the nature of the incident; however, this will be done in consultation with the relevant Lead Government Department and any Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in operation.
- 4.3** Membership will be reviewed regularly throughout the operation of the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee, with the general approach being to over-invite rather than under-invite. The precise role of a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee is likely to vary depending on the nature of the emergency at hand. However, generic aspects of the role are likely to include:
- Collating and maintaining a strategic picture of the evolving situation within the region.
  - Assessing whether there are any issues that cannot be resolved at a local level.
  - Facilitating mutual aid arrangements within or between the regions.
  - Ensuring an effective flow of communication between local, regional and national levels.
  - Raising, to a national level, any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or regional level.
  - Ensuring the national input to response and recovery is co-ordinated with the local and regional response effort.
  - Guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the region by identifying regional priorities.
  - Providing, where appropriate, a regional spokesperson.

- 4.4** There are 3 levels of response at RCCC – as follows:

**Level 1 RCCC** – Meetings would be convened in the phase prior to an emergency, where prior warning is available. They would be held to review the situation, update local agencies, and establish the state of preparedness across the region.

**Level 2 RCCC** – Meetings will co-ordinate the response to an emergency across a region. They might also be convened if a national response or national co-ordination of an event was required, such as during a fuel distribution crisis.

**Level 3 RCCC** – Meetings could only be called following the formal declaration of a decision to take special legislative measures under part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act.

### **Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC)**

- 4.5** Under the Civil Contingencies Guidance the role of the Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC) is Government appointed. The Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC) will only be appointed for Level 3 (special legislative measures) RCCC meetings.

### **Central Government Co-ordination**

- 4.6** Central Government co-ordination and support for a Catastrophic Incident is usually undertaken from the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and may be led by the Prime Minister (or Senior Minister nominated by the Prime Minister).


### **Government Liaison Officer**

- 4.7** The role of the Government Liaison Officer is to facilitate two-way communications between central government and local responders, and to facilitate the provision of support. In most cases, the Government Liaison Officer will be a member of the Regional Resilience Team and will carry out the role from either the office or through deployment to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. In some cases, an emergency may be managed effectively at Operational or Tactical level but because of the nature of the incident (likely to generate a high level of media or ministerial interest), a Government Liaison Officer may still be appointed.

### **Government Liaison Team**

- 4.8** Where the scale of the incident requires it, the Government Liaison Officer may be supported by other officials from Government Office for the North West and/or from a central government department(s) to form the Government Liaison Team. Where multiple Strategic Co-ordination Groups are established, Government Liaison Officers or Government Liaison Teams will be provided for each Strategic Co-ordinating Group.

# COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR EMERGENCIES (Regional and National elements activated as appropriate)



## CCA Responders

### Category 1

Emergency Services, British Transport Police, Local Authorities, NHS Organisations, Environment Agency, Port Health Authority

### Category 2

Utility Companies, Transport Companies, Highways Agency, Health & Safety Executive, NHS North West

For a full list see Appendix 1

## SECTION 5 – RESPONDING AGENCIES

### General

5.1 The responding agencies have in place detailed emergency response and recovery plans, (see appendix B), and where appropriate warning and informing arrangements. Below is an overview of the roles & responsibilities of the main responding agencies;

### Cheshire Police

5.2 The primary areas of police responsibility in any emergency are:

- The saving of life;
- Protection of property;
- The co-ordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other support organisations;
- Protection and preservation of the scene;
- Investigation of the incident in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable;
- The collection and dissemination of casualty information;
- In all suspected terrorist-related incidents the Cheshire Police will lead the investigation and advise on safety in accordance with the Home Office Counter Terrorist Manual;
- The co-ordination of the media response in accordance with the Cheshire Media Plan.

NB: In the event of an incident affecting the rail infrastructure, then see further details regarding British Transport Police.

### British Transport Police (BTP)

5.3 The primary areas of BTP responsibility during an ‘emergency’ (major incident on the railway infrastructure) are:

- The saving of live, together with the other emergency services;
- The co-ordination of work of the emergency services and other organisations;
- Protection and preservation of evidence and the scene;
- The collation and dissemination of casualty information;
- The investigation of the incident in conjunction with other investigative bodies, eg, HMRI (ORR) and RAIB;
- The protection/recovery/preservation of property;
- The identification of any victims;
- Restoration of normality with other agencies and organisations;
- The submission and compilation of evidence in the final report to the appropriate authorities, eg, Coroner, Public Inquiry, Crown Prosecution Service, etc.

### Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service (CFRS)

5.4 The primary areas of the CFRS responsibility in any emergency are:

- Life-saving through search and rescue;

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- Fire fighting and fire protection;
- Assisting with humanitarian services;
- Management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment;
- Salvage and damage control;
- Safety management within the inner cordon,
- Mass decontamination
- Provision of hazardous materials (HAZMAT managers)

**North West Ambulance Service (NWAS)**

- 5.5** The primary areas of responsibility for the NWAS in any emergency are:
- To save life
  - To provide treatment, stabilisation and care of those injured at the scene;
  - To provide appropriate transport, medical staff, equipment and resources;
  - To establish effective triage points and systems and determine the priority evacuation needs of those injured;
  - To provide a focal point at the scene of an incident for all National Health Agencies and other medical resources.

**NHS Organisations**

- 5.6** The NHS consists of a number of different organisations. The role of the NHS organisation will be dependent upon the type of the emergency; however, it will be usual for the local Primary Care Trust to be involved in each incident where any part of the NHS is responding.

a) Lead Primary Care Trust

In an emergency affecting more than one Primary Care Trust, the Lead PCT (NHS Western Cheshire) will act on behalf of all Primary Care Trusts, Acute and Foundation Trusts and Mental Health Trusts in Cheshire, Halton and Warrington and take responsibility for command and control of the NHS. This is a delegated responsibility from the Strategic Health Authority (NHS North West) which will be involved in any emergency at the regional level. The Lead PCT will co-ordinate attendance at any multi-agency strategic meetings and ensure that there is NHS representation at multi-agency tactical meetings.

In the event of an emergency which affects just one PCT area, the Lead PCT (via the NHS Gold Commander) will keep a watching brief of the situation.

b) Primary Care Trust

The PCT is responsible for co-ordinating its local NHS response to a major incident. This will be done via a major incident control room. The PCT will liaise with all local trusts within the PCT boundary (all NHS trusts and services involved) in responding to the incident. The local PCT will attend at the joint Tactical Co-ordinating Centre to represent the local NHS organisations involved in the response. The PCT will also:

- Provide appropriate clinical settings for the treatment of people with minor injuries;

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- Provide care and advice to evacuees, survivors and relatives, including replacement medication;
- Assist acute trusts by supporting accelerated discharge of patients;
  
- Liaise with local authorities;
- Assess the effects of the incident on vulnerable care groups;
- Establish facilities for mass distribution of counter measures (vaccinations and antibiotics);
- Administration of medications, prophylactics, vaccines and counter measures;
- Provide support, advice and leadership on the health aspects;
- Support screening, epidemiology and long term assessment and management of the effects of the incident;
- Provide psychological and mental health support in conjunction with the appropriate provider;
- Continue to provide essential services;
- Work with the local authority and community to support the recovery phase

#### c) Acute Trusts ( Hospitals)

- Provide a clinical response including provision of general support and specific / specialist health care to all casualties, victims and responders;
- Ensure there is an operational response to provide at scene medical cover;
- Continues to review its essential services throughout the incident;
- Provide appropriate support to any designated receiving hospital or other neighbouring service that is substantially affected;
- Provide limited decontamination facilities and personal protective equipment to manage self presenting casualties

#### d) Mental Health Trusts

- Co-ordinate and directly provide the psychological and mental health support to staff, patients and relatives in conjunction with Social Services;
- Advise on the long term effects of trauma on the casualties associated with the incident and recommend the appropriate level of psychological intervention where required;
- Ensure that mental health patients caught up in the incident are discharged home with appropriate support in the community from Community Mental Health Teams and Crisis Teams or their equivalent.

### Health Protection Agency

**5.7** The Health Protection Agency (HPA) is an independent body that exists to protect the health and well-being of everyone in England and Wales, delivering local services through a team based in the Cheshire & Merseyside Unit (HPU).

- Plays a critical role in protecting people from infectious diseases and in preventing harm when incidents occur involving chemicals, poisons or radiation hazards.
- Has a role in preparing for new and emerging threats such as a bio-terrorist attack, or a virulent new strain of disease i.e. Pandemic Influenza
- Provides health advice in emergencies to partner agencies and the general public on a 24 hour basis, through a locally based on call Consultant in Health

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#### Protection/Communicable Disease Control

- Provide administrative support, potential chair and members of a Scientific Technical Advice Cell (STAC) at either the Tactical or Strategic Co-ordination Centre
- Accesses nationally based HPA chemical and radiation expert advice and support.

### Local Authorities

**5.8** The Local Authority will endeavor to support the emergency services by:

- Support as necessary any rescue operations.
- Arrange and implementing traffic diversions and road closures in conjunction with the Police.
- Assist with evacuation.
- Arrange for the provision of emergency transportation.
- Provision of short term shelter through the organisation and management of reception/ rest centres.
- Co-ordinate as necessary the longer-term accommodation for evacuees and the homeless if necessary.
- Activate the Local Authority Emergency Centre to co-ordinate the Authority's response.
- Undertake public health duties.
- Assist in the establishment of any local information or enquiry points, and Media Briefing Centre if required.
- Maintain contact points with local organisations, suppliers, contractors and other public sector organisations, whose services and resources may be sought to assist the Council's response.
- Supply any information or advice, which may assist the emergency services with regard to the construction of structures, highway drainage, roads, bridges etc.
- Co-ordinate a trauma counselling service if necessary.
- If required, and in consultation with Cheshire Police, provide and manage a Friends & Relatives Reception Centre ( FRRC).
- Provide and manage premises for a Humanitarian Assistance Centre ( HAC) if required
- Provide and manage premises for an Emergency Mortuary, including the arrangements for a National Emergency Mortuary structure , as appropriate

### The Role of the Environment Agency

**5.9** The Environment Agency's role is to support and advise on environmental issues as part of the multi-agency response. It will take action, where appropriate:-

- To assess the risk posed by the incident to the environment by helping to identify how materials might disperse via environmental pathways and who/what receptors might be at risk; to prevent or minimise the impact on the environment by :-
  - a. advising on the handling, on-site storage, treatment and disposal of contaminated materials (liquid and solid) and
  - b. helping to identify facilities and contractors for the storage, transport and disposal of contaminated waters or bagged solid waste materials;
- To consider what remedial action is necessary to protect the environment and to ensure that remedial actions are undertaken in an approved, professional and competent manner. The Agency will not undertake remedial work itself. The Agency will only undertake remedial work itself when all routes have been exhausted for identifying those responsible for

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dealing with such remedial action, or the time for response is inadequate to prevent harm to human health or the environment.

- In a major air pollution incident the Environment Agency, in consultation with the Health Protection Agency (Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division), will convene an Air Quality cell.
- To notify/warn/advise relevant stakeholders, for example downstream water users, sewerage undertakers;
- To assist hazard and risk assessments by providing staff at the STAC;.

Additionally they are the principal flood risk management operating authority in England and Wales, refer to Appendix J.

### **The Role of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency**

**5.10** The Maritime and Coastguard agency (MCA) is an executive agency of the Department of Transport. HM Coastguard will initiate and co-ordinate civil maritime search and rescue within the United Kingdom Search and Rescue Region. This includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, or in danger on the cliffs or shoreline, or in certain inland areas.

### **The Role of the Port Health Authority**

**5.11** The Port Health Authority is responsible for the control of Infectious diseases, food safety, pest control, waste management and environmental protection in the waterways of the Manchester Ship Canal and the River Weaver as far as Winsford Flashes. It is responsible for the surveillance of all shipping in those waterways and docks associated with them in respect of any issues which may affect public health.

### **The Role of the Coroner**

- 5.12** The Coroner for the district where the bodies are lying will:
- In consultation with his relevant Council and Chief officer of police, initiate the establishment of the emergency mortuary
  - Authorise the removal of bodies
  - Authorise the examination of bodies to find a cause of death
  - Chair the Identification Commission and take all reasonable steps to identify the deceased
  - Where necessary, organise the collection of data concerning those bodies which may be irrecoverable but who are believed to have died in the event
  - Liaise and co-operate with other coroners who may also have, in their districts, bodies from the same event
  - Authorise the release of those bodies after appropriate examination and documentation is complete
  - At all times, liaise with the relevant emergency services and government departments.

### **Utility Companies**

**5.13** The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be co-ordinated by Police in the first instance. They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.

## **Transport Companies**

- 5.14** The transport operators can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and / or the local authorities. This includes rail, road, air and shipping operators.

## **Highways Agency**

- 5.15** For serious and major road traffic incidents on the motorway network in Cheshire where appropriate a Silver Command Centre will be established at the Highways Agency Regional Control Centre under the command of a Police Commander. The primary focus of the centre is to supplement the management and recovery of the incident. Should a JTCC also be established (eg, severe weather), the RCC will maintain close contact with the JTCC.
- 5.16** Highways Agency will adopt a coordinated approach with their Service Providers to:
- Provide support to the emergency services on incidents that occur on the Highways Agency network (motorways and some trunk roads);
  - Liaise with local authorities regarding diversion routes to mitigate the effects of additional traffic using the non core routes;
  - Release, where practicable, traffic trapped at the scene;
  - Provide welfare facilities for stranded motorists;
  - Use resources to mitigate the effects of an emergency;
  - Once the scene is handed to the Highways Agency and it becomes an HA led incident then HA will co-ordinate the recovery phase including any repair to the infrastructures.

## **Health and Safety Executive (HSE)**

- 5.17** HSE'S role is set out in the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) ie to act as the regulator to require that the risks from work activities are correctly assessed and controlled. HSE has a duty to provide advice on how the Act may be complied with.
- In addition to this HSE has a duty as a category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005, with a duty to provide relevant technical or specialist advice. This includes information on the nature of any potential hazards of the site/organisation.
  - Any assessment of the level of risk must, in the first instance, be for the duty holder or industry specialist representative in conjunction with Category 1 responders. However, HSE will become involved if the duty holder is unavailable or doesn't hold the confidence of the emergency services or the public.
  - The principles of HSE's response apply to all areas of HSE work except nuclear incidents. Whilst HSE is designated a Category 2 responder, NSD are the equivalent of a Category 1 responder for nuclear incidents.
  - HSE has a 24/7 response to incidents that includes a decision maker who will assess the initial incident and determine HSE's approach and deployment of resource.
  - Best endeavours will be used to respond to any reasonable request for information or a response at site / command centres, to an ongoing live incident. We cannot guarantee attendance out of hours but as a minimum we will offer telephone advice.
  - Proportionate arrangements (i.e. a Duty Officer and an up to date list of telephone contacts) are in place via regional plans to allow HSE representatives to access telephone advice from "experts" within HSE, the Health and Safety Laboratory and from third parties with identified expertise. Experts will not be on a call-out rota and physical attendance is not guaranteed but is again on a best endeavours basis.

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- HSE will proactively contact those leading the response to an incident to make them aware of what support we can provide (even when not notified).
- HSE has an interest in identifying and requesting the securing of all, or part, of the scene of an industrial incident, which may be important for evidence. This will usually be when any primary emergency service response is complete and it is safe to do so.

**5.18 Military (HQ 42 NW Brigade)**

See Appendix K for details of military response capability

## SECTION 6 – SCENE MANAGEMENT

### Cordons

- 6.1 Cordons are established around the scene for the following reasons:
- To guard the scene;
  - To protect the public;
  - To control the sightseers;
  - To prevent unauthorised interference with evidence or property;
  - To facilitate the operations of the emergency services.
- 6.2 Cordons will be established by Cheshire Police and Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service as appropriate. The inner cordon provides immediate security of the hazard area and potential crime scene. The outer cordon seals off an extensive area around the inner cordon. In the event of an incident on the rail infrastructure then British Transport Police and Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service will be responsible for the inner cordon. The perimeters of cordons will be subject to Dynamic risk assessments by The Fire & rescue Service and Cheshire Police and will be dependent on the type and scale of the incident.
- 6.3 In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under Section 16(c) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. This includes the crossing of a Police cordon.

### Inner Cordon

- 6.4 Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service has responsibility for safety management of all personnel within the inner cordon except for a terrorist incident. Where an incident occurs upon the railway network then CFRS would be responsible during the rescue phase, after which responsibility would pass to the lead rail industry responder.
- 6.5 CFRS will log all personnel entering or leaving the inner cordon.

### Outer Cordon

- 6.6 Cheshire Police will control all access and exit points to the outer cordon.
- 6.7 The command/control vehicles of the emergency services should be positioned between the inner and outer cordons, as will the Rendezvous Point (RVP) and Marshalling Area.
- 6.8 Diversions & Traffic management may be established to restrict vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.

### Rendezvous Point

- 6.9 This will be established within the outer cordon and will be under the control of a Police Officer.


### Marshalling Area

- 6.10 Marshalling Area may be established under the control of an officer from the emergency services. This area is for resources not immediately required at the scene, or which, having served their purpose, are being held for future use. It should, therefore, be an area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles.

### Incident Control Point (ICP)

- 6.11 An incident control point should be established at or near to the scene attended by the responding agencies. The ICP is the focal point for the on-scene management of the emergency.

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## SECTION 7 – HEALTH & SAFETY AT THE SCENE

### Health and Safety

- 7.1 The responsibility for health and safety of staff at a major incident rests with each agency. Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service (CFRS) is responsible for safety management within the inner cordon and advice given must be acted on by all emergency services. If CFRS identifies the need to evacuate the area, then all emergency agencies personnel must comply with the instruction.
- 7.2 However, Police and Ambulance should endeavor to have a health and safety professional on the scene as soon as possible to advise their respective tactical commanders and carry out on-site risk assessments and identify control measures and safe systems of work.
- 7.3 The safety advisors may also need to liaise with local authority Environmental Health Officers and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) inspectors who may wish to visit the scene.
- 7.4 The safety advisors may be involved in on-site co-ordinating meetings. Prior to the meeting they should discuss control measures, safe systems of work and ongoing site and dynamic risk assessments. The advice and risk assessment must be documented so as to provide a record for the future analysis of good practice and accident investigation.

### Emergency Evacuation Signal

- 7.5 Any person employed to work or enter the inner cordon will be suitably briefed prior to entry. Part of this brief by the Entry Control Officer will include the emergency evacuation signal that will be employed if necessary and the area to withdraw to.
- 7.6 A number of pool Airwave radio terminals are available for issue to incident commanders from both police and fire incident command vehicles at the scene. These operate on a shared talkgroup and allow for critical messages to be passed between each emergency service (e.g. evacuation of inner cordon). Each service commander is then responsible for ensuring that these messages are then communicated within their own respective radio networks.

### Factories and Other Industrial Sites

- 7.7 Some locations have a range of potential hazards including substances that are flammable, reactive, explosive or toxic. Sometimes the hazards are multiple (for example, flammable and toxic) and may involve corrosive or radioactive materials. Protective clothing and breathing apparatus may be necessary for personal safety. Some hazards are not detectable by human senses.
- 7.8 A number of locations in Cheshire are identified as 'Top-Tier' Sites, under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999. They are identified by the HSE and The Environment Agency, as they either store, manufacture, use or hold quantities of hazardous materials, which exceed certain predetermined thresholds. These locations are required to:
- Have up to date On Site and Off Site plans
  - Write to all residential & business premises within a prescribed distance from the site boundary – the 'Public Information Zone (PIZ)' and provide a means of giving a warning to those within the PIZ.

- 7.9 In the context of COMAH incidents, the term 'major accident' is used by those agencies involved and should not be confused with the term 'major incident'. In Cheshire the term 'Cloudburst' is used for further information see Appendix C.
- 7.10 Enforcing authorities, including the Health and Safety Executive and The Environment Agency, will need access to such locations following major accidents and may need to gather evidence.
- 7.11 Additionally to the COMAH identified sites there are other sites within Cheshire, identified as Lower Tier COMAH sites, which store, manufacture, use or hold quantities of hazardous materials. The quantities held by these sites are also predetermined but do fall within the scope of the top tier COMAH site regulations. However COMAH regulations implicitly require that these sites have in place mitigation measures and emergency response arrangements

## SECTION 8 – PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE EMERGENCY

### Casualties

8.1 A primary responsibility of the emergency services at an emergency is the recovery and documentation of casualties. Casualties fall into one of four categories:

- Evacuees.
- Uninjured
- Injured;
- Deceased

8.2 Family Liaison Officers may be deployed at the direction of the Police Senior Investigating Officer (SIO).

8.3 Further detail is available in the North West Mass Casualties Plan

### Evacuees

8.4 Some emergencies may require the evacuation of large numbers of people. The decision to evacuate must be carefully considered to ensure that sufficient resources are available and that the evacuation does not place those concerned in greater danger.

8.5 Evacuation is co-ordinated by Police and is usually undertaken on the advice of the Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service or following consultation with partners prior to any decision to evacuate. In some circumstances, personnel from all agencies may have to assist in carrying it out. The appropriate Local Authority must be informed immediately the decision to evacuate is taken or being considered

8.6 A suitable Evacuation Assembly Point will need to be established and rest centres may need to be set up by the local authority. Evacuation, by its nature, is difficult due to people self evacuating prior to the arrival of the emergency services. Where possible details of people should be noted at the scene and collated. This will assist in their return in an efficient and effective manner.

### Uninjured

8.7 Uninjured people will be removed from the scene as quickly and safely as possible.

8.8 They will all be potential witnesses however, and the Police Service will need to collate their details for the benefit of the Casualty Bureau as well as the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). This can be done at suitable premises nearby, called the Survivor Reception Centre.

### Injured

8.9 Injured people need to be rescued from the scene as quickly and safely as possible, subject to any requirements of the ambulance and medical teams on site. Ambulance paramedics and technicians then need to be able to administer the appropriate pre-hospital treatment before the patients are taken to the receiving hospitals.

### Vulnerable People

8.10 During any Major Incident there will be certain people who are vulnerable due to their circumstances either personal or situational as well as those people who are vulnerable due to the nature of the incident and the response to that incident. All agencies have processes in place to identify such people and any command group should consider this issue at an early stage

## **Premises and Facilities that may be required;**

### **Survivor Reception Centre**

**8.10** Premises near to the scene of the incident will be identified dynamically following an incident.

**8.11** The Survivor Reception Centre is a secure area in which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid. Information will usually be gathered by police documentation teams and interviews undertaken where necessary. It may be established and run initially by the emergency services – who will be first on the scene – until the local authority becomes engaged in the response.

### **Emergency Rest Centre**

**8.12** In the event of a major emergency where shelter is required for the people directly involved in that emergency the Local Authorities may open a Rest Centre.

**8.13** All Local Authorities have premises identified that can be utilised as a rest centre and have staff trained to manage the centre. Other agencies form part of the response, and management of the rest centre, and these include Police, Health and Voluntary agencies.

**8.14** Further detail is available in the Local Authorities Rest Centre Plans.

### **Friends and Relatives Reception Centre**

**8.15** Experience has shown that in the immediate aftermath of an incident many people will travel to the scene or to meeting points such as travel terminals if they believe their family or friends may have been involved in an emergency. If necessary, the police, in consultation with the local authority, will establish a Friends & Relatives Reception Centre at a suitable location, to help reunite family and friends with survivors – it will provide the capacity to register, interview and provide shelter for family and friends. These may be near the scene, in the area of the community affected or at arrival and departure points.

**8.16** Any commercial, industrial or other organisations concerned may also need to be consulted as they may have a role in providing assistance. Friends & Relatives Reception Centres will be staffed by police, local authority staff and suitably trained voluntary organisations. The authorities should also consult and involve representatives of faith communities whenever appropriate. Interpreters may also be required.

### **Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HAC)**

**8.17** The provision of a HAC will be a decision for the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. Local Authorities have identified premises suitable for this purpose

**8.18** The purpose of the Humanitarian Assistance Centre is to:

- Act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved families and friends and survivors, and where appropriate to anyone else who has been affected.
- Enable those affected to gain as much information as is currently available about missing family members and friends.
- Enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, which enhances the ability to identify loved ones quickly.
- Offer access to a range of facilities that will allow families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs.
- Ensure a seamless multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that should minimise duplication.

8.19 Further detail is available in the CLRF HAC Plan.

### **Casualty Bureau**

- 8.20 Police may establish a Casualty Bureau as soon as practicable where details on all evacuees, uninjured, injured and deceased will be collated.
- 8.21 At the same time they will take enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident.
- 8.22 Casualty Bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries.
- 8.23 Where a match is made they will contact the enquirer and inform them of the condition and whereabouts of the person concerned. If the information is of a delicate nature it will be delivered by a personal visit from a Police Officer.
- 8.24 To avoid discrepancies in casualty figures all information must be routed through the Casualty Bureau, which will be the sole source of casualty information. Casualty figures must only be released following consultation with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group.

### **Dealing with the Deceased / Establishing a Body-Holding Area and Temporary Mortuary Facility**

- 8.25 In the event of a disaster involving multiple fatalities it may be necessary to set up a Body Holding Area close to the incident. Should normal mortuary facilities prove insufficient it may then become necessary to activate additional emergency mortuary facilities. This decision will be taken by the Coroner in conjunction with the Police Senior Investigating Officer and the Local Authority. Local Authorities have identified suitable premises for body-holding and emergency mortuary purposes. These should ideally provide privacy, security, ease of access and parking.

Refer to S12 of this plan and the CLRF Mass Fatalities Plan.

## SECTION 9 – INVESTIGATION

### Evidence

- 9.1** The saving of life takes primacy to evidence collection.
- 9.2** Every major incident may be the subject of an investigation, whether for HM Coroner, a public inquiry, or civil or criminal court proceedings. As a result the evidence collected should be of the best possible quality.
- 9.3** Depending upon the nature of the incident several different agencies may carry out their own investigation. These agencies may include, for example:
- Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service.
  - Cheshire Constabulary.
  - British Transport Police.
  - The Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB).
  - The Marine Accident Investigation Branch.
  - Maritime and Coastguard Agency
  - The Health and Safety Executive.
  - The Environment Agency
  - Office of Rail Regulation (including HM Inspectorate of Railways).
  - Rail Accident Investigations Branch.
- 9.4** Such evidence can only be gathered if the scene is secured as soon as possible and anything, which can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence is preserved and not damaged, moved or disposed of without reference to the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO).
- 9.5** Aerial photography, both video and stills, can help throughout the incident in recording the scene for evidential purposes, as will any other photographic evidence available.
- 9.6** Each agency is responsible for the accurate recording of any decisions taken and retention of key documents.

## **SECTION 10 – TELECOMMUNICATIONS**

### **10.1 Airwave**

Airwave is a national secure communications network, primarily used by the emergency services. A number of additional agencies within the Cheshire LRF also now have access to Airwave terminals, allowing for a range of communications options in a major incident.

To ensure resilience of Airwave communications during a major incident, early advice should be sought from a member of the police Airwave team, as the increased traffic may overload the network if control measures are not implemented. It is important that the telephony function and private radio calls are restricted by users, to prevent unnecessary network congestion. Airwave Operations must be notified of a major incident, to enable mast site monitoring and the deployment of response vehicles to enhance network capacity if required.

### **10.2 Airwave – Interim Bronze Interoperability Solution (IBIS)**

Pool Airwave terminals are held at police headquarters and within the Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service command vehicle. During a major incident the terminals can be distributed to emergency service commanders for the purpose of passing critical or potentially life threatening information between each service.

Although primarily used by Bronze commanders, they may be issued to other key responders if it is necessary to pass or receive urgent communications. A brief guide is included with the terminals at the distribution point, to ensure ease of operation if no prior training has been received. The terminals can be requested by any emergency service at the scene of a major incident.

### **10.3 Mobile Telecommunication Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS)**

During a major incident, mobile phone networks can become congested due to increased mobile phone use by both emergency services personnel and members of the public at or near an incident scene. The Access Overload Control (ACCOLC) system previously allowed the police Gold commander to instruct the network operators to enable only ACCOLC registered handsets network access, thus denying public access.

The ACCOLC system has been replaced by the Mobile Telecommunication Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS). If a major incident occurs, the Gold commander can request network operators are notified, who will then commence cell site monitoring to ensure MTPAS registered handsets are afforded priority over public calls in the affected area. Crucially, public telephony is no longer automatically disconnected when the scheme is implemented.

Each eligible organisation is responsible for submitting their own MTPAS applications and maintaining currency through the Resilient Telecommunications sub-group. In addition, a number of pool MTPAS mobile phones are held at police headquarters and

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within the Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service command vehicle, available for issue to commanders and/or critical staff from any agency at the scene of the incident who may be experiencing communication difficulties. Should demand exceed the number of available phones, priority will be given to supporting functions related to life saving and rescue operations.

**For further information please consult the Cheshire LRF Resilient telecommunications Plan**

## SECTION 11 – MEDIA / PUBLIC RELATIONS PROTOCOL

### Media Arrangements

**11.1** Media channels should be used to provide advice and reassurance to the public. A media management Plan for the area has been adopted by all agencies (Cheshire LRF Media Plan ) and will come in to effect during any major incident. The Plan lays down protocols to ensure that timely and accurate information is passed to the media by each agency and organisation; that the flow of information is co-ordinated between agencies; and that facilities are provided for the media, ensuring that they do not hamper the operational effectiveness of the agencies.

Under the Plan, all agencies and organisations are expected to issue their own press statements dealing with matters within their remit. Statements will be factually accurate and restricted to confirmed information within the organisations own domain. The release of information will be co-ordinated by the Police Press Office (initially from Police HQ) and agencies should consult with the Police Press Officer on the timing and detail of press releases. The Civil Contingencies Act requires agencies to have and test their communications preparedness for a major incident.

In the initial aftermath of an incident, a media liaison point at a forward, but safe position, will be identified at which news teams will gather. A Press Officer will co-ordinate the flow of information to the media at the liaison point, and the management of the media presence, including the facilitation of interviews.

In an extended incident, it may be necessary to establish a formal facility as a Media Briefing Centre. This centre, located in a safe but forward area, will act as the operational base for Press Officers of all agencies and will be used for formal press conferences which will be held on a regular basis. Local Authorities will identify facilities that they manage which could potentially be used for this purpose. These sites will be used if appropriately located in a particular incident. If circumstances preclude their use, the Police Incident Commander will identify a more appropriate site.

All agencies will maintain records of their news releases to facilitate a thorough debrief and evaluation of the media management process at the conclusion of an emergency.

**11.2** The media cell, located at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC), in consultation with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) will advise and assist in communicating with external news organisations.

**11.3** To maintain confidence it is crucial that all information provided to the public (particularly health/scientific advice) is consistent before being authorised for release to the media. It is therefore important that very close links exist between local, regional and national agencies.

**11.4** The Cheshire LRF Media Plan provides detailed guidance on managing media interest in an emergency, and working with the media to warn and inform the public. All agencies should be familiar with the operating principles contained within it, and the requirements for emergency preparedness outlined in it in line with civil contingency legislation.

## SECTION 12 – PLANNING FOR MASS FATALITIES

Note: This section does not deal with fatalities caused by Infections. This issue is dealt with separately under Pandemic Flu Planning

- 12.1** A mass fatalities incident is defined as any incident where the number of those who have died is greater than normal local preparedness arrangements can manage.
- 12.2** Whilst such incidents are infrequent occurrences, they tend to happen without prior notice. Recent mass fatalities incidents within the United Kingdom and elsewhere include those brought about by transport related disasters; those brought about by terrorist activity; those arising from other criminal actions, (with or without intent to cause such high numbers of casualties and deceased); and those as a result of a natural disaster.
- 12.3** The process has several key elements (see figure 1, which take place at several locations).
- 12.4** Although overall responsibility for the body lies with the Coroner in whose district the victims are found, different stages will be led by different organisations (eg body recovery is primarily a Police responsibility, establishment of the emergency mortuary will be led by the Local Authority, management of the operations within the mortuary will involve Police, forensic experts and Mortuary Managers).
- 12.5** It is imperative, therefore, that the key organisations work together closely and ensure that supporting organisations (eg Funeral Directors and private contractors) are fully engaged throughout.
- 12.6** Disaster Victim Identification: The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has established a national Disaster Victim Identification Team (UK DVI). UK DVI is a police-led, virtual team of trained and experienced police and civilian forensic experts. Arrangements are in place to deploy UK DVI members to an incident that results in large scale fatalities. Their role would be to supplement but not replace, the local response. UK DVI is managed by ACPO and has capacity to deploy in the United Kingdom and abroad, at the request of the Foreign Office;
- 12.7** For further details see **Cheshire LRF Mass Fatalities Plan**

## SECTION 13 – VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

### Voluntary Agencies Introduction

**13.1** Members of the voluntary agencies could have an important role to play in the response to an emergency.

### Responsibility

**13.2** Many voluntary agencies have emergency procedures and associated call-out arrangements, copies of which are held by Local Authorities. In the event of a serious or major incident the local authority will co-ordinate the voluntary sector response to requests for humanitarian assistance

### The Roles of the Voluntary Agencies

**13.3** Voluntary Agencies within Cheshire have strong links with Local Authorities. The roles they may perform may differ slightly but this section shows the key roles

**13.4** British Red Cross - Support people in a crisis, provide emotional/psycho-social support, first aid, ambulance, transport, telephone Support Line Operators, Disaster Appeals, stocked mobile unit on-call, therapeutic care, wheelchair loan, care in the home.

**13.5** Cheshire Churches - Pastoral counseling and use of buildings (e.g. church halls).

**13.6** Cheshire Lowland Search & Rescue - Search and rescue volunteers who may be activated by the Police Commander.

**13.7** RAYNET (Radio Amateurs Network) – Provides emergency radio communications to assist the work of the Police, Ambulance Service, British Red Cross, St John Ambulance, and other organisations by supplementing the existing means of communications.

**13.8** RSPCA - Collection, transport and veterinary assistance for animals in need of removal. Rescue and provision of first aid for animal casualties.

**13.9** Salvation Army - Support to local authorities at Rest Centres (registration, catering, befriending, psychological support, clothing), under the guidance of Local Authorities and first responders. Catering for emergency services and first responders.

**13.10** Samaritans - 24/7 provision of emotional support to those in need.

**13.11** St John Ambulance Brigade - Provision of front line ambulances and support vehicles. Provision of ambulance transport/first aid posts/ first aid facilities at rest centres.

**13.12** Women's Royal Voluntary Service - May provide highly trained and equipped volunteers to support the local authority. Volunteers trained in registration, reception, information, health and safety hygiene, serving refreshments. Catering equipment available.

**13.13** Local Authorities also have contacts with other voluntary organisations who may be able to provide additional assistance.

## SECTION 14 – STAFF WELFARE AND INCIDENT DEBRIEFING

### Welfare

- 14.1 Welfare is of paramount importance and all agencies must have procedures in place to identify and meet the welfare needs of their staff.
- 14.2 Local Authorities have crisis support plans which may assist in this process.
- 14.3 All agencies have procedures in place to monitor and assist people where required. Some people however may require skilled professional help and all agencies should have procedures in place to accommodate this.

### Debriefing

- 14.4 At the conclusion of any incident consideration should be given to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the response through incident debrief. Initially post incident debriefing should be conducted by each agency and where appropriate followed by a multi agency debrief to feedback to the Local Resilience Forum. Where appropriate procedures may be amended or updated and incorporated into subsequent editions of this manual, other plans and the Community Risk Register.
- 14.5 Debriefs should not interfere with or comment on investigations into the incident carried out by investigative or judicial authorities.
- 14.6 It is important to realise that such debriefs and related documents may be disclosable to individuals involved in legal proceedings and through Freedom of Information Act enquires.

## SECTION 15 – RECOVERY PHASE

- 15.1** Consideration of recovery should be part of day-to-day emergency planning.
- 15.2** In any major emergency early consideration should be given to identifying and anticipating recovery issues and the formation of the recovery working group at an appropriate time. The aim is to return the community and infrastructure to normality.
- 15.3** The transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase will be dependent on the unique circumstances of the incident and will be agreed between the Local Authority and Police, either at the Tactical Co-ordinating Group or the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (if operational). The handover of co-ordination of the incident from the Police to the Local Authorities must be formally recorded. At this stage the co-ordination of the response will be lead by the appropriate Local Authority.
- 15.4** The Local Authorities will, depending on the scale and nature of the recovery issues, establish and chair a Recovery Working Group, after consultation with other agencies.
- 15.5** The Recovery Working Group may comprise of representatives from the following agencies:
- Relevant Local Authorities
  - Appropriate Health agencies
  - Police
  - Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service
  - Environment Agency
  - Utilities
  - Other agencies/organisations could be co-opted as necessary.
- 15.6** Although it is difficult to predict in advance what issues the Recovery Working Group will need to consider, they will probably include the following:
- Social impacts
  - Health impacts
  - Economic impacts
  - Environmental impacts
- 15.7** **Further detail is available in the CLRF Recovery Plan**

## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A – RESPONDING AGENCIES**

<p><b>Category One Responders</b></p> <p>Cheshire Police  British Transport Police  Cheshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service  Halton Borough Council  Warrington Borough Council  Cheshire West and Chester Council  Cheshire East Council  Countess of Chester Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  Mid Cheshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust  North Cheshire Hospitals Trust  East Cheshire NHS Trust  Central and Eastern Cheshire PCT  NHS Halton and St Helens  NHS Warrington  NHS Western Cheshire  NW Ambulance Service NHS Trust  Health Protection Agency  Environment Agency  Maritime &amp; Coastguard Agency  Port Health Authority</p>	<p><b>Category 2 Responders</b></p> <p>Electricity Suppliers*  Gas Suppliers*  Water Undertakers*  Public Communications Suppliers*  Network Rail  Train Operating Companies*  Freight Operating Companies  Airports*  Harbours and Ports*  Health &amp; Safety Executive*  Highways Agency  NHS North West</p>
<p><b>Category 1 Responders</b> are the core responders, while <b>Category 2 Responders</b> are the key co-operating bodies in both private and public sectors.</p> <p>In addition, HQ42 (NW) Brigade, as a member of the Cheshire, Halton and Warrington LRF (although not designated as a Category 1 or 2 Responder) may be part of any response to a major incident. (Go to <a href="http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040036.htm">www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040036.htm</a> where the Civil Contingencies Act can be viewed and downloaded.</p>	
<p>* As defined in the Act and Regulations made under it.</p>	

## APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY PLANS

- B1** In addition to the specific emergency plans referred to in this manual, individual agency / responders create and maintain detailed emergency plan to support their respective organisational response.
- B2** In Cheshire a number of multi agency plans have also been created to underpin the response to particular challenges, examples include;
- COMAH plans
  - Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Plans
  - Media Plan
  - Rest Centre Plans
  - Crisis Support Plans
  - Mass Fatality Plans
  - River Dee Emergency Plan
  - River Mersey Rescue Plan
  - Flood Plans
  - REPPIR Plan
  - CBRN Plan
  - Humanitarian Assistance Centre Plan
  - Recovery Plan
  - Resilient Telecommunications Plan
  - Emergency Plan for Fuel
  - Influenza Pandemic Plan
  - Heatwave plans
- This list is not exhaustive.
- B3** Each agency has a responsibility to prepare and maintain business continuity plans which will complement any emergency plan.

## APPENDIX C – CLOUDBURST DEFINITIONS

### Primary Cloudburst

- C1** The operational response and actions of the Police, Fire, Ambulance, Local Authorities, NHS and the Health Protection Agency in the event of a 'major accident', see definition below, at a Top Tier COMAH site involving a toxic gas or other dangerous substance within COMAH regulations. The declaration is normally made by the site operator but, in light of circumstances, may be made by the senior officer of any emergency service present at the incident. The occurrence must have the potential to affect areas outside the boundary of the premises.

*Major accident' means an occurrence (including in particular, a major emission or fire or explosion) resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances.*

### Secondary Cloudburst

- C2** The operational response and actions of the Police, Fire, Ambulance, Local Authorities, NHS and the Health Protection Agency in the event of an incident involving toxic gas or chemical release at a premises other than a Top Tier COMAH site. The occurrence must have the potential to pose a serious danger to human health or the environment outside the boundary of the premises. This will normally be declared by the Senior Fire & Rescue Service Manager present at the location.

### Mobile Cloudburst

- C3** The operational response and actions of the Police, Fire, Ambulance, Local Authorities, NHS and the Health Protection Agency in the event of an incident involving toxic gas or chemical release at a location such as highways, railways, shipping or pipelines. The occurrence must have the potential to pose a serious danger to human health or the environment in the surrounding area. This will normally be declared by the Senior Fire & Rescue Service Manager present at the location.

## APPENDIX D – DEFINITIONS OF EMERGENCY UNDER THE REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN

### Local Emergency

**D1** A local emergency (sometimes referred to as a major incident) is one which is routinely handled by the emergency services with local government. The police will normally take the lead in coordinating the local response. Where there is a police lead, the operational response is in the hands of the Police Strategic Co-ordinating Group Commander. The role will include chairing a Strategic Co-ordination Group to co-ordinate the response of all the emergency services and other organisations in saving life, protecting the public and the environment, and where appropriate, bringing those responsible to justice. Emergencies of this sort are likely to be manageable through resources available within the region, though there is likely to be some liaison with the Lead Government Department. The Police Strategic Co-ordinating Group Commander (or equivalent) will normally invite the Regional Resilience Team to provide a Government Liaison Officer to carry out this liaison role. Examples of local emergencies include severe weather and prolonged power outages.

### Significant Emergency

**D2** A significant emergency has a narrow focus requiring central government support primarily from a Lead Government Department in addition to the work of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations as part of their normal day-to-day activities. An emergency of this scale would not normally involve the activation of the Civil Contingencies Committee. Examples of emergencies of this scale include severe weather and a terrorist incident with limited consequences.

### Serious Emergency

**D3** A serious emergency is one which has, or threatens, a wide and prolonged impact requiring sustained central government co-ordination and support from many departments and agencies, including the regional tier in England. Such challenges would include a major terrorist attack or serious outbreak of animal disease. The central government response would be led by the Civil Contingencies Committee under the direction of the Home Secretary or a nominated lead Minister.

### Catastrophic Emergency

**D4** A catastrophic emergency is one which has a high and potentially widespread impact and requires central government direction and support such as a 9/11 scale terrorist attack in the UK or a Chernobyl scale industrial accident. The response would be led by the Civil Contingencies Committee often with the Prime Minister in the chair and harnessing all possible resources.

### Other Emergencies

**D5** There will also be occasions where incidents of a lesser scale and impact (i.e. those that do not lead to the formation of a Strategic Co-ordination Group) require a regional response. In the main, this will be because the emergency has attracted high media and/or Ministerial interest. To ensure that all the emergencies described above are responded to appropriately, as a general rule responders are asked to contact the North West Regional Resilience Team in Government Office for the North West if an incident is leading to or is likely to lead to the formation of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group or if an incident has or is likely to attract a high degree of media or Ministerial interest.

## Appendix E EXOTIC ANIMAL DISEASES

Defra is the lead government department when preparing for and managing a notifiable animal disease outbreak in England.

Defra have produced an Exotic Animal Disease Generic Contingency Plan

To facilitate this role, with specific annexes on foot and mouth disease, avian influenza, Newcastle disease and classical swine fever.

Defra would be responsible for:-

- establishing a **National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)** to lead in managing the tactical level response to a disease outbreak.

The NDCC will:-

- include representatives from all relevant central government departments and agencies, operational partners and wider stakeholders.
- provide a co-ordinated response to the direction received from the national Strategic Group
- receive operational feedback, collate information and provide accurate reports and devise tactics for operational implementation
- provide information and guidance to the Defra Emergency Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) via the Animal Disease Policy Group.

### Animal Health (AH)

Animal Health (AH) was made an Executive Agency of Defra in April 2005. It will

- take the lead on all operational aspects of emergency preparedness and control in relation to animal disease at both a national and local level across Great Britain and
- develop national and local animal disease contingency plans
- lead the implementation of contingency plans if required.
- regularly test both national and local contingency plans through contingency exercises
- ensure that operational partners and stakeholders are engaged in the development and testing of the contingency plans to ensure all key parties have a common understanding of roles and responsibilities in a disease outbreak.

At a national level, Animal Health will

- have overall responsibility for tactical and operational requirements
- take a key role in the implementation of the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)
- ensure that a **Joint Co-ordination Centre** is established within the NDCC
- collect and collate outbreak intelligence
- escalate data to the strategic level
- provide tactical guidance to the operational level
- facilitate two way communications between disease eradication personnel

Animal Health will also have a significant input into the decisions made at a strategic level, and will play a fundamental role in ensuring effective communication takes place across central government and delivery partners.

At a local level, Animal Health Regional Office(s) (AHRO), in this case Preston Regional Office North

West, will

- establish and manage the implementation of **Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs)** where appropriate.

The Local Disease Control Centres will

- facilitate the implementation of disease control measures at an operational level, and
- enable effective co-ordination of all delivery partners and stakeholders involved in controlling the disease at a ground level.

Animal Health will utilise pre-arranged operational instructions contained within the Operations manual.

## APPENDIX F - INCIDENTS ON RAILWAYS

### Emergency Services Rail Incident Protocol

- F1** Cheshire has an extensive railway network, which includes the West Coast mainline. Incidents on railways require additional specialist knowledge and there are further roles and responsibilities for other category one and two responders including, British Transport Police, Network Rail, Train Operating Companies and Freight Operating Companies.
- F2** A Rail Incident Officer (RIO) will be despatched to the scene of an incident by Network Rail Control. The RIO provides the principal contact point with the railway companies and will assist emergency services personnel in establishing a safe method of operation.
- F3** In the absence of a RIO, responders who are first at the scene must be aware of the inherent risks regarding train movements and electrification. Further guidance is contained in "Railway Safety for the Emergency Services".
- F4** In Major incidents the investigation will normally be led by British Transport Police (unless involving a category 'A' murder or terrorism), supported by the Cheshire Constabulary. However, it is acknowledged that the initial attendance at incidents will probably involve Cheshire officers and in greater numbers.
- F5** The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) may deploy Rail Incident Care Teams to work alongside other responding agencies and provide assistance and support at both Family and Friends Reception Centres and Humanitarian Assistance Centres. They do not normally attend the scene of the incident.
- F6** Incidents on Railways should also be considered in conjunction with the following documents:
- Railway Safety for the Emergency Services
  - Emergency Services Rail Incident Protocol
  - Management of a Fatality Occurring on Network Rail Controlled Infrastructure in England & Wales
  - NPIA guidance on Emergency procedures (Section 4.8 Rail Incidents)
  - British Transport Police Major Incident Manual (MIM 2006)
  - Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) Train Operators Safety Group Good Practice Guide
  - ATOC Approved Code of Practice – Joint Industry Provision of Customer Care Following a Major Passenger Rail Incident
  - ATOC Incident Care Team Guidance Manual
  - Railway Group Standard GO/RT 3118 Incident Response Planning & Management.
- F7** To ensure an effective response to an incident on the rail network the industry can provide inputs on:
- Safety of personnel;
  - General site safety;
  - Specialist information on rolling stock and infrastructure (tunnels, services, etc);
  - Specialist input to investigation; and
  - Recovery equipment either owned or under contract.

## **Rail Incidents – “Power Off - Trains Stopped”**

- F8** The safety of personnel is paramount when working on or near the track.
- F9** It is obviously dangerous to go into the vicinity of electrified railway lines or overhead power cables. Apart from the danger of electrocution, it must be realised that merely having the power switched off may not have the effect of stopping trains. Diesel powered trains, for example, are not dependent on the electric power and sometimes run on the same track.
- F10** The request for ‘power off – trains stopped’ should be passed through the appropriate agencies control or locally through railway managers. Network Rail will confirm that this request has been carried out to the agencies control.
- F11** Personnel must always wear high visibility clothing when working on or near the track. The number of such personnel working at the scene should be kept to a minimum.
- F12** There is a need to be clear which rail organisation controls the track involved. Network Rail controls the majority of the rail infrastructure in Cheshire, so on Network Rail-controlled infrastructure they will be the lead authority for the rail industry at rail incidents and will protect the scene in consultation with the emergency services.
- F13** Generally, one, or all, of the following three levels of control can be introduced as protection for the site:  
Level I – slowing trains by running them at caution\*;  
Level II – stopping trains by use of signals;  
Level III – switching off electricity supply.
- \* It should be clearly understood by responders that trains running at caution may not necessarily be able to stop quickly.
- F14** It is obviously dangerous to go into the vicinity of the railway because of the railway equipment, electrified lines, overhead power and the movement of trains.

## APPENDIX G – AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

### Introduction

- G1** A major air incident is by its very nature an extremely sudden and catastrophic event placing all the organisations concerned with the response under intense pressure. The scale of such events often crosses administrative boundaries and involves a massive and lengthy recovery operation.
- G2** Major incidents involving aircraft that occur within airfield boundaries will involve a local response based upon Civil Aviation Authority directions and locally agreed protocols.
- G3** Protocols exist between Cheshire Police, Greater Manchester Police and Merseyside Police to provide mutual aid and assistance in the event of an air incident.
- G4** Protocols exist between Cheshire Local Authorities, Manchester City Council and Liverpool City council to provide mutual aid and assistance in the event of an air incident

### Specific Site Hazards

- G5** A major air incident will produce a toxic environment at the scene and all agencies responding should be aware of the need for extra attention to the identification of potential hazards and the protection of their staff. A crashed aircraft should be approached from an upwind direction due to the potential spread of toxic substances.
- G6** Manchester, Liverpool and Hawarden Airports have plans and procedures in place with the relevant emergency services to support their Emergency Response facilities.
- G7** In addition both the AAIB and RAF are able to advise on potential hazards from crashed aircraft and the materials present in specific aircraft types. The Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Flight maintains a database for all UK military aircraft. They can fax hazard data sheets to any emergency service on request to their Task Control. Contact via Cheshire Police.

### Organisations Involved

#### Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB)

- G8** The AAIB investigates all civil aircraft accidents that occur in the UK and helps in the investigation of military accidents at the request of the Ministry of Defence. There are a number of statutory powers associated with this role through the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1989. These regulations gave the AAIB powers of investigation relating to the management of the scene. Close liaison between the AAIB investigators and the emergency services at the scene is essential at the earliest possible opportunity.
- G9** Police will be responsible for contacting the AAIB on being informed of an incident. The initial AAIB response to a major air accident will consist of a small team of pilots and engineers who will work with RAF pathologists, where necessary. The Police investigation will be carried out in close co-operation with that of the AAIB.

**Royal Air Force (RAF)**

**G10** The RAF will deal with post-crash recovery for all military fixed wing aircraft accidents and has the capability to help with civilian incidents, where requested, particularly with wreckage removal in line with AAIB guidance. The unit involved is the Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Flight. RAF Search and Rescue resources may be alerted by calling the Air Rescue Co-ordination Centre (Kinloss) Contact via Cheshire Police.

**Royal Navy**

**G11** The Royal Navy will deal with all military rotary-wing aircraft crashes. The unit is the Mobile Aircraft Servicing Unit.

## APPENDIX H – EMERGENCIES ON TIDAL AND INLAND WATERS

### Introduction

- H1** There are many differences in the response required between land and river-based incidents not the least of which being the culture of mariners and river users. For instance, there is a common law duty on the master of a vessel to go to the assistance of another vessel or person in distress. Public involvement may thus play a greater role than would otherwise be expected in a land-based incident.
- H2** The tidal nature of the rivers Mersey and Dee lead to complications in that the location and the area of an incident will inevitably change due to the movement of the tide in its ebb, flow and height. Even in non-tidal reaches, the river current will have a similar effect. All this varies with time, weather conditions and season. Hence the expression 'search and rescue' (SAR) which implies that the first problem the emergency services have in an incident is locating and securing the scene.
- H3** The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has a statutory duty in relation to the activation of civil search and rescue response to vessels or persons in need of assistance on all UK tidal waters. This will include the tidal stretches of the River Mersey or River Dee. The MCA, where possible, will also assist in the response to emergencies on non-tidal waters.
- H4** The River Dee (Chester) Emergency Plan prepared by Cheshire West & Chester Council provides details of the multi-agency response to an emergency on the stretch of the River Dee between Farndon Bridge and the Dee Canal Lock. The Environment Agency Local Flood Warning Plan for the Cheshire Police Force Area, sets out the details of the Flood Warning Services provided by the Agency for rivers and the sea within this area.
- H5** The Manchester Ship Canal is a thirty-six mile waterway that provides access for shipping to docks and berthing facilities along its full length between Eastham, Merseyside and Salford Quays in Manchester. Large passenger ferries also use the canal for pleasure cruises between Eastham and Salford Quays. The operators of the canal, Peel Holdings, are responsible for producing an emergency plan for the canal, docks, and adjacent land.
- H6** British Waterways, a public corporation, has responsibility for the maintenance and operation of their canals and navigations within the Cheshire, Halton and Warrington area. These include the Shropshire Union, Trent and Mersey, Bridgewater, and Macclesfield Canals and their branches, as well as the Weaver Navigation. British Waterways are responsible for the provision of safety equipment on these waters.
- H7** The River Mersey Aircraft Rescue Plan provides a coordinated response by the Emergency Services and relevant agencies in dealing with an incident where an aircraft ditches into the River Mersey. The plan covers the entire area of the River Mersey from the mouth of the river at New Brighton to the weir at Warrington with the Manchester Ship Canal forming a southern boundary.
- H8** Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service have two dedicated water specialist teams based at Chester and Warrington which can be deployed anywhere within the county for use on tidal and inland waterways.

## APPENDIX J - FLOODING

### Introduction

**J1** Flooding is a natural feature of the environment; however the human and environmental costs can be high.

**J2** Flooding occurs from a number of sources:

- **River (fluvial) flooding** as a result of water overflowing from river channels
- **Surface water (pluvial) flooding** when natural and man-made drainage systems have insufficient capacity to deal with the volume of rainfall
- **Groundwater flooding** when the level of water underground rises above its natural surface
- **Coastal flooding** when the sea level rises above the level of coastal land.

### Environment Agency Warnings Service

**J3** The Environment Agency is the principal flood risk management operating authority in England and Wales with the lead role for providing flood warning where practical and possible to protect people and property at risk. N.B: For the Dee Catchment operational response will from EA Wales.

**J4** The Environment Agency will ensure by best endeavours that warnings are issued to those at risk within flood warning areas and to ensure that the main river network is operating to full capacity utilising resources available.

**J5** The agency will issue flood warnings and oversee operation of assets and defences. Site controllers oversee incidents on the ground and the Area Incident Room contains Operational and Flood Warning duty teams.

**J6** The flood warning service provided by the Environment Agency applies to:

- Flooding from rivers, watercourses and the sea throughout England and Wales
- Flooding related to the above such as sewers unable to discharge into swollen rivers.

#### **It does not apply to:**

- Flooding from surface water, road drains, sewer flooding and burst water mains.

**J7** Warnings are disseminated from the Agency's area incident room in the form of faxes, emails, text messages and pre-recorded telephone messages. Flood warning status information is also available on the Internet and by ringing the Flood Line recorded message service. They are coded as follows:

### **J8** Flood watch

- Flooding of low-lying land and roads is expected, be aware, be prepared, watch out.
- Triggers: Forecast of high tides, recorded or forecast river and or rainfall levels that will cause flooding and snow melt forecast.

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- Impact: Bank-full rivers, flooding of fields, minor roads, car parks and farmland. Spray/wave overtopping along the coast, overland flow from rivers and streams and localised flooding due to heavy storms.

#### **J9 Flood warning – (tidal and fluvial)**

- Flooding of homes and businesses is expected. Act now!
- Triggers: Forecast of high tides, forecast river levels that will cause flooding and snow melt forecast.
- Impact: Flooding of homes and businesses and significant spray/wave overtopping along the coast and flooding of major road infrastructure.

#### **J10 Severe flood warning**

- There is extreme danger to life and property. Act now!
- Triggers: Site observations of severe flooding or major problems with infrastructure and services. Forecasts predict a worsening situation or prediction of major surges threatening coastal locations.
- Impact: Large numbers of properties (min 100) are expected to flood, higher risk to life and possibility of failure or overtopping of defences.

#### **Short term impacts**

**J11** It is possible that residential properties, business premises and farmers land could be damaged by flooding. Local Authorities and the Environment Agency have access to sandbags which can be used to protect properties and to defend Environment Agency assets. If necessary, Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service can provide assistance with pumping operations. Local Authorities will also provide assistance in relation to drainage and carry out engineering works.

**J12** The Police North West Underwater Search & Marine Unit, Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service or Royal National Lifeboat Institution may be called upon to assist if people require rescuing from flood waters.

#### **Longer term impacts**

**J13** There are also potential longer term impacts from flooding, including:

- Environmental impact including clean up and waste disposal
- Repairs to public assets / infrastructure
- Restoration of power, communications and water
- Domestic and business insurance claims
- Displaced businesses
- Humanitarian assistance needs including homeless / displaced residents and psychological impacts.

#### **Warning and informing the public**

**J14** The principal method of warning the public of flood risk is via the Environment Agency's Floodline Warnings Direct system, and messages that the Environment Agency issue via local media. The Environment Agency also has access to portable public address speaker systems.

## APPENDIX K- MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO A MAJOR INCIDENT

### The Military: HQ 42 (NW) Brigade and the Military Response

#### UK Operations and Military Aid

**K1** Military planning for graduated responses to meet a wide range of contingencies in the UK in peace, tension/crisis and war is conducted under the umbrella title of “UK Operations” which encompasses Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). MACA may be requested because the Armed Forces’ structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of benefit in time of emergency to fill civil authority capability gaps. However it must be understood that the Armed Forces are funded for defence purposes and the responsibility for dealing with civil emergencies clearly lies with the civil authorities. That said, the Armed Forces may be required to assist the civilian authorities when there is a threat to life, or when the community is in danger of being deprived of the essentials of life.

#### Principles of MACA

**K2** The provision of MACA is guided by three principles:

- Military aid should be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other law enforcement agencies, and the private sector must be insufficient or be unsuitable.
- The Civil Authority lack the required level of capability and it is unreasonable to expect it to develop one.
- The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and there is an immediate lack of Civil Power resources..

#### Military Response

**K3** The capability of the Armed Forces to respond to a MACA request is based on three pillars:

**Pillar 1.** The Army regional chain of command (HQ 42 (NW) Brigade in the North West of England) and RN, Army and RAF Regional Liaison Officers.

**Pillar 2.** Communications for the regional chain of command provided by 2 (NC) Signals Brigade.

**Pillar 3.** The force elements provided by regular and reserve forces. In the first instance, support is likely to be provided by the most appropriate and available regular unit, which can be drawn from within the North West or from across the UK. Thereafter reserve forces may be mobilised. All reserve forces in the North West are available for deployment on MACA tasks. These forces may be based on a single unit or form a composite force as a source of general duties support to supplement the local civil emergency response.

#### Possible Military Tasks

**K4** During a range of contingencies, MACA support may be requested by the civilian authorities. Such aid could fall under the auspices of Military Aid to the Civil

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Community (Category A – Emergency) (MACC Cat A), Military Aid to the Civil Police (MACP) or Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD). Local military can respond directly to requests for MACC Cat A assistance whilst MACP and MAGD requests require Ministerial approval. During an emergency situation, the military may be able to assist with some of the following specialist and non-specialist tasks: Command, Control and Communications (C3) infrastructure support; reconnaissance; search assistance; evacuation tasks; engineering tasks; cordon control; logistic and administrative support including transport lift; and other general duty tasks. The military also possess a number of boats within the North West and in a loan pool at Ripon, Yorkshire. Trained boat crews are also available including within 75 Engr Regt at Warrington.

### **Funding / Indemnity**

- K5** MACA activity is, with a few specific exceptions, not funded within the MOD vote and is conducted on a repayment basis. No costs are charged to the civil authority in situations where life is at risk or in other exceptional circumstances. Concern about costs should never preclude calling for assistance in times of emergency. MOD requires to be indemnified against potential claims rising out of the assistance requested and the appropriate form requires signature by the requesting authority.

### **Request Procedures**

- K6** If MACA support is required, civilian authorities should make initial contact with HQ 42 (NW) Brigade via Cheshire Police Control Room.

## APPENDIX L - CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEVICES

- L1** CBRN terrorism entails the assumption or knowledge, based on intelligence or actual evidence, of actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or with explosives), with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or economic or symbolic points. Accidental releases – classed as HAZMAT are not referred to as CBRN incidents.
- L2** CBRN incidents involve an immediate, co-coordinated, multi-agency response, requiring concurrent investigations, including specialist advice, a clear and consistent media and public reassurance strategy and customised procedures, plans, training and equipment (e.g. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), detection equipment, decontamination, evacuation and managing fatalities).
- L3** CBRN terrorism has the potential to create massive media, public and political interest at home and abroad. The scale of this interest is not necessarily proportionate to the level of material or agent released. Even the smallest release, once shown or believed to be deliberate, will have a significant impact on public or political opinion. It can also be expected to produce deep, searching and prolonged media coverage.
- L4** A CBRN event, whether a pre-planned intelligence-led operation or a spontaneous response to activation or the threat of activation, real or hoax, is a criminal act and must be dealt with accordingly.
- L5** The main functions of the emergency agencies and other agencies at a CBRN incident are the same as those laid out earlier in this Manual. However, both the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) and Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service (CFRS) have additional responsibilities specific to the decontamination process. CFRS can also call upon the services of Detection, Investigation and Monitoring teams (DIM). These are strategically placed specialists in other Fire & Rescue Services who can provide specialist equipment, personnel and advice at the scene of a CBRN incident.

### **Decontamination**

- L6** This is the reduction of contamination to lower the risk of further harm to contaminated casualties and to lower the risk of cross-contamination. Decontamination can take several forms ranging from improvised decontamination by persons responding to an immediate and necessary need through to full and comprehensive decontamination.

### **Clinical Decontamination**

- L7** The process where contaminated casualties are treated individually by trained healthcare professionals using purpose designed decontamination equipment.

### **Mass Decontamination**

- L8** The planned and structured procedure delivered by the Fire and Rescue Service using purpose designed decontamination equipment where there are large numbers of casualties.

### **Interim Decontamination**

- L9** The use of standard equipment to provide a planned and structured decontamination process prior to the availability of purpose designed decontamination equipment.

### **Improvised Decontamination**

**L10** The use of an immediately available method of decontamination prior to the use of specialist resources.

- **Ambulance**

The NWAS is responsible for decontamination and will retain clinical responsibilities for casualties in all decontamination scenarios.

- **Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service**

CFRS is responsible for mass decontamination.

**L11** In the event that the Coastguard Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre becomes aware of a CBRN incident or possible CBRN incident at sea or on the coast, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency Duty Counter Pollution and Senior HQ officers will be informed without delay.

### **INCIDENTS INVOLVING WHITE POWDER OR OTHER SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCES**

#### **Definition of White Powder**

**L12** A suspicious unidentified powder, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs.

#### **Definition of a suspicious substance**

**L13** A suspicious unidentified solid, liquid, gel, crystal or granular material, of any colour, not believed to be explosive or drugs.

**L14** Incidents involving White Powder or other suspicious substances may potentially be associated with terrorism and be classed as CBRN incidents or result from criminal activity.

**L15** Incidents of this type may incorporate some form of incendiary or Improvised explosive devices, where this is suspected an immediate request for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) to attend the scene will be made.

**L16** Cheshire Police, Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service and North West Ambulance Service have an MOU in place to deal with incidents of this type.

## APPENDIX M – LARGE SCALE EVACUATION

### Introduction

**M1** In certain emergencies, the decision may be made to evacuate certain specific parts of Cheshire, Halton and Warrington.

### Principles for Large Scale Evacuation

**M2** Large-scale evacuation will always be a last resort and the decision will need to balance whether or not the population can be afforded better protection by remaining in situ.

**M3** In considering or executing evacuation procedures care must always be taken not to put people at risk by bringing them outdoors when they might be more effectively protected sheltering indoors. This is particularly important where hazardous substances have been released or where the exact location of an explosive device is unknown.

**M4** Large-scale evacuation will require specific management/command and control in addition to the incident management.

**M5** The decision to evacuate from the scene of any incident is usually be taken by the Police Commander in consultation with, the senior Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service Officer, senior Local Authority Officer(s), and other appropriate specialists.

**M6** The overriding principal behind any evacuation is the safe and rapid removal from the perceived danger of persons at risk.

**M7** The following points require consideration by the Evacuation Officer or person acting in that capacity.

- The size of the area, zone or zones to be evacuated.
- Premises requiring evacuation.
- Timescale.
- Personnel/resources required to achieve evacuation.
- Evacuation points.
- Reason(s) for evacuation.
- Method of evacuation.
- Access/Exit points and routing of evacuees.
- Assembly point locations
- Location of rest centres.
- Security of the evacuated area

## APPENDIX N – INFECTIOUS DISEASES

### Planning for infectious disease outbreaks- Including an Influenza Pandemic

- N1** Outbreaks of infectious diseases in human populations are common and typically occur on a local and small scale. They are routinely managed effectively through existing control mechanisms developed by the Health Protection Agency.
- N2** Significant modelling and planning has taken place, leading to a programme of training and exercising of plans at a Local, Regional and National level.
- N3** The LRF has prepared An Infectious Diseases Plan which addresses the management of an incident of this type. Appendices relating to other infectious diseases (SARS, smallpox, etc) will be included in this Plan. ( The Infectious Diseases Plan is available on the CLRF Website)
- N4** The LRF Infectious Diseases Plan is a comprehensive document outlining the multi agency response structures, organisational roles and responsibilities of all agencies. The Plan details communications mechanisms and actions required to reduce the impact and spread of diseases.
- N5** The LRF plan is closely linked to the Regional Infectious Disease plan and Department Of Health guidelines.

## APPENDIX P – HM Coastguard Search and Rescue Helicopters

- P1** HM Coastguard SAR helicopters may also be called upon to assist in marine or land rescue incidents. Coastguard helicopters are equipped to winch people from the water or from vessels and can carry seated and stretcher casualties. They are fitted with infrared equipment to assist location of casualties in the water in poor visibility and at night.
- P2** HM Coastguard helicopters are alerted through Liverpool Coastguard for marine incidents and by the Police Agencies through the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre at RAF Kinloss for land incidents.
- P3** SAR helicopters are also operated by both the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. The armed forces also have a large number of helicopters that may be made available to civilian authorities under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities arrangements.

## APPENDIX Q – Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

### Leadership

**Q1** In the initial stages of any emergency the immediate concern is likely to be the risk to human health from substances involved. The STAC is likely to be required to provide advice on whether to shelter or evacuate people around the scene, and the safety of responders.

In the initial stages of the response to an emergency an appropriate person from the health community is the most appropriate person to lead the cell, ie,

- Health Protection Agency Consultant in Health Protection or
- Primary Care Trust Director of Public Health.

As an incident progresses, the focus may move away from health matters to wider environmental concerns. It may therefore be appropriate for the lead to be reassigned to a more appropriate person/agency with the necessary knowledge and experience.

### Location of the STAC

**Q2** The STAC will be located at the Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre (JTCC). If however during an incident a Strategic Co-ordinating Centre is subsequently set up, the STAC team will relocate to the SCC, at an appropriate time

In the event of an SCC being established at the time a major incident is declared, the STAC will initially be co-located with the SCC.

### Role of the STAC

**Q3** The STAC is expected to advise on a range of issues including:

- The impact on the health of the population
- Public safety
- Environmental protection
- Sampling and monitoring of any contaminants

The role of the cell in response to an incident would be to:

- Provide a common source of scientific and technical advice to the Strategic or Tactical Commander and other agencies.
- Co-ordinate the responding scientific and technical community to deliver on the high level objectives and immediate priorities.
- Agree any divergence from agreed arrangements for providing scientific and technical input.
- Pool available information and seek a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different courses of action.
- Seek to provide a common brief on the extent of the evidence base available, and how the situation might develop, the implications and likely effects of mitigation strategies.
- Liaise between agencies represented in the cell and their national advisors to ensure consistent advice is presented locally and nationally.

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- Ensure a practical division of effort among the scientific response to avoid duplication and overcome any immediate problems arising.
- Identify other agencies/individuals with specialist advice who may be required to join the cell to inform the response.
- Maintain written records of decisions made and the reasons.

### **Membership of the STAC**

**Q4** The composition and function of the STAC will be incident specific and tailored to local requirements. All members should have the necessary knowledge and skills to collectively provide scientific and technical advice in any emergency. The cell is always likely to include specialists in health, the environment, and site specific information i.e. COMAH site operators

STAC leads should ensure that only those specialists necessary for the effective management of the incident are present.

Membership may include:

- Health Protection Agency
- Director(s) of Public Health from a Primary Care Trust
- Relevant emergency services technical advisors i.e. Fire Service HAZMAT Manager
- Local Authorities (e.g. Environmental Health Officer)
- Secretariat/Staff Officer Support
- Police Liaison Officer
- Environment Agency
- Representative from Site Operator ( if appropriate)
- Food Standards Agency
- Met Office
- DEFRA
- Government Decontamination Service (If required)
- Representative(s) from any other organisation as required.

### **Activation of the STAC**

**Q5** The decision to activate will be made by the Senior Multi Agency Co-ordinating Group. The first meeting of this “Core” STAC will consider its composition against the particular needs being generated by the incident.

The “Core” STAC will consist of appropriate representatives from the following Agencies:

Emergency Services Liaison Officers (x3)  
Environment Agency  
Health Protection Agency  
Primary Care Trust ( Public Health )  
Local Authority (EHO)

It will be the responsibility of each contributing agency to ensure that appropriate staff are mobilised when they are notified of an incident.

## **Additional Information**

Cheshire resilience Forum Website  
[www.cheshireresilience.org.uk](http://www.cheshireresilience.org.uk)

Cheshire, Halton and Warrington LRF Community Risk Register  
[www.cheshireresilience.org.uk](http://www.cheshireresilience.org.uk)

**Connecting in a Crisis BBC, 2003**  
[www.bbc.co.uk/connectinacrisis](http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinacrisis)

**Department of Health Emergency Planning Guidance 2005**  
[www.dh.gov.uk](http://www.dh.gov.uk)

**Emergency Planning for Major Accidents: Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999**  
HSE Books, 1999 (ISBN 0 7176 1695 9)  
[www.hse.gov.uk](http://www.hse.gov.uk)

**Risk Assessment and Risk Management - Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, 1998**  
[www.hse.gov.uk](http://www.hse.gov.uk)

**Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2002**  
[www.mcga.gov.uk](http://www.mcga.gov.uk)

### **Emergency Preparedness/Response/Publications**

[www.ukresilience.gov.uk](http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk)

- **Civil Contingencies Act 2004**
- **Emergency response and Recovery Guidance 2010**
- **Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies**
- **Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Guidance on Establishing Family Assistance Centres - Joint publication by the Cabinet Office and ACPO**
- **Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience**
- **The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines**
- **The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations' Volunteers in Civil Protection**
- **Working Together to Support Individuals in an Emergency or Disaster**
- **The Lead Government Department and its Role - Guidance and Best Practice (CCS March 2004)**

[www.defra.gov.uk](http://www.defra.gov.uk)

- **National Flood Emergency Framework for England**
- **Flood Rescue Concept of Operations**
- **Exotic Animal Diseases Contingency Plan**